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THOUGHT PIECE – ‘THE INCOME GENERATION ENGINE’ IN SOCIAL BUSINESS 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: The objective of this article is to conceptualise how voluntary and community sector (VCS) 
organisations in England responded to a dramatic shift in the policy and funding environment since 
2010 (or ‘austerity’). It does this by investigating how case study VCS organisations have attempted 
to continue to deliver ‘NR’ (NR) support to disadvantaged areas. 
Design/methodology/approach: This article is informed by research undertaken over five years 
during a period a period of dramatic policy shift in England, between 2009 and 2013. Through a set 
of case study ‘NR’ organisations, primarily from the VCS, it utilises existing literature and primary 
quantitative and qualitative data on organisational change in the case studies to conceptualise how 
VCS organisations have attempted to survive an austere environment whilst continuing their 
missions of supporting disadvantaged communities. 
Findings: Those VCS organisations considered ‘successful’ have adapted their strategies and 
structures around what might be called an ‘income generation engine’ in order to navigate an 
austere environment. There are both strengths and weaknesses to the income generation engine 
which has implications for social business organisations and their beneficiaries. 
Limitations: Case study research is always very limited in terms of its generalisability and different 
cases may have resulted in different findings, but the aim of this ‘thought piece’ article is to raise 
awareness of the speculative or emergent concept of ‘the income generation engine’ in order to 
increase understandings of how VCS organisations might increasingly need to operate in an austere 
environment, and their implications. 
Contributions: This article has developed the concept of ‘the income generation engine’ from 
experiences of practice during a period of dramatic shift in policy and funding environments. It has 
implications for practice and policy, as well as conceptual debate.  
 
Social Business and Income Generation Engines 
The focus of this thought piece is on how voluntary and community sector (VCS) organisations 
delivering ‘NR’ (NR) in England have responded to a dramatic shift in the policy and funding 
environment since 2010. Whilst this topic appears very specific, the findings of this investigation 
have implications for readers of Social Business. VCS organisations delivering NR have had to 
navigate and respond to an environment that has shifted from being relatively stable and publicly-
funded to one characterised by uncertainty, constraint and the search for sustainability through a 
more ‘diverse’ profile of funding sources beyond the state. Sound familiar?  A common ‘solution’ to 
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this major challenge for many VCS organisations has been the development of what might be called 
‘the income generation engine’. As with all engines, the income generation engine has both 
strengths and weaknesses which stakeholders involved in social business should be aware of. 
 
UK policy over the last 20 years – a ‘roller coaster ride’ for VCS organisations 
Voluntary and community organisations in the UK, particularly England, have experienced a ‘roller 
coaster ride’ in their funding environment over the last 20 years. The previous Labour 
administrations of 1997 to 2010 invested a great deal of resources into the VCS, as part of a social 
democratic ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1998) which aimed to mitigate state and market dominance. 
Welfare provision aimed to be delivered through a ‘mixed market’ of public, private and VCS (or 
‘third sector’) providers, and the VCS was heavily supported by successive Labour administrations to 
build the sector’s professionalism and capacity to engage in this process. Concurrently, the same 
Labour administrations also invested heavily in ‘urban regeneration’ and ‘neighbourhood renewal’ as 
part of an agenda to reduce inequalities between the poorest neighbourhoods and the ‘national 
average’. Many small and medium-sized VCS organisations were created or became engaged in this 
agenda – particularly through NR programmes, given their localised contexts and missions of 
supporting disadvantaged communities. However, the fallout from the financial crisis, followed by 
the installation of the Conservative Liberal-Democrat Coalition Government in 2010 saw dramatic 
policy shift under ‘austerity’, resulting in the rapid termination of almost all funding for NR 
programmes and significant cuts to funding to local authorities – both being major sources of 
income for VCS organisations during the Labour years. Summarising Scott (2010), many VCS 
organisations have moved from a time of relative plenty to a time of famine. 
 
Methodological Approach 
A number of case studies (primarily VCS organisations) involved in delivering NR practice were 
investigated through evaluative research on their performance and management processes:  
 A local authority-funded Neighbourhood Management group involving community 
representatives and other local stakeholders; 
 A central government-funded NR programme partnership organisation, and its independent 
‘successor’ organisation; 
 A multi-agency and community partnership involving community sector representatives; 
 A regeneration agency-funded ‘work-based learning programme’ for practitioners, and; 
 An independent local regeneration organisation  
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Looking across these case studies’ experiences of delivering NR initiatives, a number of key 
organisational ‘factors’ were identified as critical to delivering sustainable NR practice before 
dramatic policy shift. The data was then analysed following dramatic policy shift to identify if and 
how these factors had changed. Comparing before and after policy shift resulted in the development 
of a conceptualisation of changes in organisational practice in NR following a period of shift. 
 
Organisational factors critical to successful regeneration practice before policy shift 
Empirical research across the case studies identified a number of ‘organisational factors’ considered 
critical to sustainable NR practice. For two cases, the first factor was that resident representatives 
felt there was some community ‘ownership’ of the NR process (Factor 1). This was considered critical 
in generating a broad consensus during the design and development of local regeneration strategies 
(Broughton et al, 2009; Jarvis et al, 2012). 
In two cases, the commitment of increasingly trusted professionals was critical to maintaining and 
progressing relationships between communities and influential agencies. These ‘embedded’ 
professionals (often with strong connections to the area) essentially provided a conduit for 
advocacy, offering brokerage (Factor 2) between residents’ concerns and senior decision-makers at 
local authority level, which had the resources to move things forward (Jarvis et al, 2012). Over time a 
positive balance was struck between the desire for local control and the necessity for wider 
collaboration and resources to get things done. This was manifest in organisations’ assertive yet 
collaborative negotiations and formal agreements with various agencies representing broader city-
level interests. Such processes assisted in legitimising and driving forward local strategies at city 
levels, where political power and resources resided (Broughton et al, 2009). 
Continuous collaborative brokerage often gave case study neighbourhoods greater visibility and 
legitimacy within cities’ institutional and political landscapes – or institutional positioning (Factor 3). 
Coupled with the financial incentives of regeneration programme funding, this institutional 
positioning resulted in some case study NR organisations becoming key players within city-level 
structures over time. Such legitimacy resulted in organisations being able to leverage resources from 
other stakeholder agencies, and to negotiate more sustainable outcomes for local residents in 
collaborations with agencies (Broughton et al, 2013a). 
A third case study (a multi-agency and community partnership) provides evidence of another 
organisational factor critical to sustainable regeneration practice – that of leadership (Factor 4). 
Research identified examples of joint working between public service agencies and key actors in 
local faith organisations, which aimed to enhance well-being in neighbourhoods across a large 
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county. Agency stakeholders reported accounts of the commitment and enthusiasm of key actors in 
faith organisations to support public agencies around improving neighbourhoods through mobilising 
other members of the community (Jarvis et al, 2010). However, this ‘leadership’ was not just 
leadership in terms of ‘executive’ leadership, or faith organisations only, but leadership in its 
broadest sense – ordinary people courageously rising to a challenge out of a sense of social justice, 
responsibility, duty or faith. This broader interpretation of leadership is thus a critical organisational 
factor in sustainable NR practice. The first and second case studies also highlighted the importance 
of leadership – not just from practitioners but also community representatives – in terms of their 
individual commitment to moving the NR process forward. 
The generic skills and knowledge (Factor 5) of those involved in NR organisations are also critical to 
sustainable practice. Empirical evidence from a regeneration management training course illustrated 
the critical nature of generic skills and knowledge to sustainable regeneration practice, partially 
informed by Egan’s (2004) Skills for Sustainable Communities report. Findings show how 
practitioners working across organisational boundaries dramatically enhanced a range of generic 
skills through this training programme, such as relationship development, resulting in positive 
regeneration outcomes for their regeneration organisations (Broughton et al, 2010). 
Given the research findings above, a ‘Factor Menu’ was developed outlining some common 
organisational factors which appeared to lead to successful practice outcomes for NR organisations 
prior to policy shift: 
 ‘Community ownership of the NR process’ 
 ‘Brokerage’ 
 ‘Institutional positioning’ 
 ‘Leadership’ 
 ‘Generic skills and knowledge’. 
 
What dramatic policy shift ‘looked like’ to NR organisations 
The key drivers of dramatic policy shift, within the NR arena (but also for many other policy arenas), 
might be conceptualised as a ‘triple whammy’ of consecutive events taking place between 2008 and 
2010 (Broughton et al, 2011). This triple whammy began with the 2008 credit crunch and 
subsequent recession putting significant pressure on public funding in the last two years of (then) 
Gordon Brown’s Labour Government. Second, the planned phasing-out of key NR programmes (such 
as the New Deal for Communities programme) began to be undertaken, along with a shift in the 
emphasis in NR initiatives towards economic, rather than social, aims (and with reduced funding) in 
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response to the recession. The final element of the triple whammy was the instalment of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition involving dramatic policy shift, resulting from a broader 
programme of ‘austerity’ to drastically reduce the public spending deficit. 
The triple whammy ultimately resulted in a political landscape which had little place for NR as a 
policy instrument. For some NR organisations, the initial impact of the triple whammy, from the 
recession, involved property value losses (which hindered the second case study) and the stalling of 
regeneration frameworks dependent on land sales and strong land values (which threatened the 
first case study). NR delivery organisations ultimately faced a policy environment ‘vacuum’, placing 
NR (and urban regeneration more broadly) at a crossroads in its future role and direction. 
The changing policy environment resulted in a range of new circumstances for delivery organisations 
at local level. To organise these, analysis of developments reported by the case study organisations 
resulted in the conceptualisation of a new typology of ten thematic developments – the ‘10 Cs’ –
which characterised dramatic policy shift. These ‘policy shift Cs’ resulted in both opportunities and 
challenges for NR organisations. These involved: 
 
 Commissioning challenges: Local authority cuts resulting in ‘centralisation’ (or ‘centralised 
localism’) of commissioning powers from local level to city-wide executive level, diluting 
‘brokerage’ (Factor 2) and institutional positioning (Factor 3). 
 
 Co-ordination: Austerity resulted in back-office ‘co-ordination’ staff considered as superfluous. 
 
 Consolidation: Consolidation of local public service commissioning contracts, increasing their 
size/scale to reduce costs; squeezing out smaller local organisations which had limited capacity. 
 
 Competition: Funding cuts increased competition for resources between neighbourhoods; the 
Localism Act (2011) opened up new opportunities for (new) delivery organisations through the 
‘right to challenge’ existing service providers. 
 
 Collaboration: Opportunities were taken by some smaller regeneration organisations to merge, 
to respond to larger-scale contracts and commissioning frameworks. 
 
 Commercial Sector: The recession saw increased demand for employment support from NR 
organisations; reductions in capital investment reduced private sector investment leverage; 
concerns over private sector dominance in decisions by new Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). 
 
 Consumer models: Policies of encouraging VCS organisations to utilise commercial business 
models were expanded further; ‘fee-charging’ has increasingly replaced subsidised services. 
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 Employment creation over employment support: Policy prioritised those closest to the labour 
market, pushing the marginalised with higher support needs further down the queue. 
 
 Data capture and management: Abolition of local authority performance frameworks in 2010 
resulted in a data vacuum; evidence of inequality between neighbourhoods / areas obscured. 
 
 Communities and inequalities: the new challenges to local regeneration organisations appeared 
at odds with the Coalition Government’s new ‘Big Society’ and Localism agendas, which also 
disregarded the need for adequate resources to address the lack of a level playing field across 
different communities. 
 
By the early 2010s, the impact of the various ‘policy shift Cs’ on the broader landscape for NR 
organisations was clearly very challenging. Their landscape was characterised by many difficult 
challenges and few opportunities, and was to have a dramatic impact on those organisational factors 
critical to sustainable NR practice identified above.  
 
Organisational factors critical to sustainable NR practice after policy shift 
Following policy shift, the empirical research identified that the organisational factors prior to policy 
shift had been influenced by the new post-shift environment, but additionally that such change was 
being driven by two newly identified ‘underpinning’ factors: 
 Income Generation Engine (underpinning driver) 
 Organisational Dynamism (underpinning driver) 
 Community ‘ownership’ of the NR process – severely weakened 
 Brokerage – re-shaped for income generation engine 
 Institutional positioning – re-positioned for income generation engine  
 Entrepreneurial Leadership 
 Entrepreneurial Generic skills 
 
Empirical evidence across the relevant case study organisations suggested a significant weakening of 
a sense of community ‘ownership’ of the NR process (Factor 1). Neighbourhood-based policy 
instruments and funding streams from the previous Labour government were abolished by the new 
Coalition Government, replaced by ‘Big Society’ and ‘Localism’ self-help initiatives with minimal 
funding that lend themselves to wealthier communities with resources of their own (Broughton et 
al, 2013b). Second, evidence suggested that ‘brokerage’ had narrowed its focus on income 
generating activities with primarily economic goals (Factor 2). Back-office co-ordination and 
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neighbourhood management functions have been victims of austerity, and remaining brokerage 
relationships began to focus on where state funding did still remain – i.e. on initiatives with 
economic (rather than social) goals, such as employment creation and enterprise development. 
Third, evidence suggested that institutional positioning was now driven by ‘competitiveness in 
collaboration’ (Factor 3). NR organisations implicitly compete to seize the most influential and 
financially advantageous positions in broader collaborative networks or consortia of service 
provision. Fourth, there was evidence to demonstrate how leadership had become far more 
entrepreneurial (Factor 4). Delivery opportunities for NR organisations had become increasingly 
market-based and competitive, requiring the adoption of commercial cultures of leadership and 
recruitment of leaders with business acumen. Finally, empirical evidence appeared to show how 
remaining support for generic skills and knowledge largely became focused on commercial and 
business skills (Factor 5). The continued ‘marketisation’ of public and welfare services had resulted in 
any remaining support for skills development being driven by commercially-focused narratives and 
instruments. 
In addition to the significant changes that have taken place to the organisational factors in the ‘pre-
shift’ Factor Menu, the analysis also unearthed two additional organisational factors that appear 
critical to sustainable NR practice following dramatic policy shift. These factors consistently underpin 
most of the other factors comprising the modified or ‘post shift’ Factor Menu. These underpinning 
factors are ‘the income generation engine’ and ‘organisational dynamism’. 
The ‘Income Generation Engine’ 
Dramatic policy shift has resulted in unprecedented reductions in public funding for many NR 
organisations, VCS organisations and public agencies, especially local authorities. Austerity, in a neo-
liberalist economic context, has become the ‘norm’. For those NR organisations choosing to 
‘maintain their place’ or attempting to ‘scale up’ in response to this new environment (rather than, 
for example, ‘downsizing’ to a volunteer-centric model or by closing), the replacement of lost 
income is the overriding concern. NR organisations, as well as VCS organisations generally, have had 
to develop an ‘income generation engine’ within their organisational frameworks in an attempt to 
replace lost public funding. Reduced resources, increased competition, and no let-up in demand for 
support services suggest that income generation engines are now critical to organisational survival.  
The funding (or ‘fuel’) for the income generation engine is increasingly likely to originate from a 
more diverse range of sources, given reduced state funding. Whilst this has involved maximising 
opportunities where public funding still exists (e.g. employment creation and enterprise 
development) it has increasingly involved identification of new forms of funding for regeneration 
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activities, such as social investment, philanthropic funding and fee charging. In some cases, the 
income generation engine may be being used as a ‘Robin Hood’ model – squeezing every drop of 
surplus income from service contracts to subsidise more socially-oriented provision which (under 
receives little other funding under austerity). However, income generation engines also appear 
costly to maintain and income surpluses often need to be re-invested in their upkeep, before funds 
can be distributed to other socially-oriented activities. Further, competitive pressures and continued 
reductions in public service funding increasingly leave NR organisations with little surplus, putting 
more socially-oriented provision further under threat. 
The income generation engine is arguably the underpinning driver of many of the changes to the 
other organisational factors in the post-shift NR Factor Menu, leading to changes in sustainable NR 
practice. Much-needed socially-oriented initiatives, including the engagement of the community in 
the NR process, become marginalised in favour of maximising income for the ‘engine’, such as 
initiatives with purely economic goals or in areas outside beneficiary local community. This results in 
a weakening of the community’s ‘ownership’ of the NR process; residents feel their interests, 
agendas and priorities no longer align with those of the NR organisation. Brokerage, institutional 
positioning and generic skills are also increasingly guided by the market-based needs of the income 
generation engine, shifting their focus away from broader social goals. The needs of the income 
generation engine, therefore, lie at the heart of much of the change in the NR Factor Menu following 
policy shift, and thus changes in sustainable NR practice. 
 
Organisational Dynamism 
In a neo-liberal economic context under austerity, where short-termism by governments and major 
political parties appears to be intensifying, NR organisations need to be increasingly ‘fleet of foot’ 
internally to respond to change. They need to be ‘organisationally dynamic’ in their structures, 
processes and staffing, to react to frequent changes in the external policy and funding environment, 
including ‘markets’. The downside is a persistently volatile environment lacking stability, apparently 
reflected in continuous change within NR organisations. Organisational dynamism also appears to 
underpin the modified NR Factor Menu in that competitive pressures force organisations to seek 
efficiencies, which include social objectives where return on investment is ‘lowest’. 
The second case study organisation offers an early insight the development of organisational 
dynamism within NR organisations. Research explored how this organisation’s restructuring first 
developed an income generation engine in the form of a ‘trading arm’. This enabled the organisation 
to undertaken necessary ‘outward’ expansion beyond its original beneficiary neighbourhood (in 
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terms of geography and diversity of activity). This organisation also demonstrated examples of 
organisational dynamism including continued review of opportunities for cost efficiencies, tax-
efficient possibilities, and legal arrangements that maximise funding and value (Broughton et al, 
2013a). Similar to the income generation engine, organisational dynamism also appears to underpin 
those changes to the NR Factor Menu; organisational dynamism, in combination with the income 
regeneration engine, sets the framework for the organisational activity of NR organisations, steering 
and shaping the delivery portfolio of sustainable NR practice. It is arguable that this case study 
organisation has sought a balance between sustainable income generation and social objectives, but 
there remain concerns about how far this balance can remain sustainable in the longer term. 
 
The future role and nature of NR organisations and their practice 
The findings and emergent conceptualisation within the post-shift NR Factor Menu have important 
implications for the future role and nature of NR organisations and their practice, under austerity 
and beyond. The modified NR Factor Menu points towards the role of NR organisations being 
increasingly viewed as ‘non-profit’ service providers with commercial goals, rather than community 
advocates with a social mission (Fuller, 2016). The austere environment is obliging NR organisations 
to direct attention and resources towards opportunities well beyond the remit of their original 
beneficiary neighbourhoods, to fuel the necessary ‘income generation engine’ they need to survive.  
Continued marketisation of public services and funding mechanisms (e.g. social investment) are also 
marketising the nature of NR organisations, as well as VCS organisations generally (Maier et al, 
2016), compelling them to engage in ‘organisational dynamism’ to compete. NR organisations are 
increasingly focusing attention on accessing opportunities based on funding efficacy – primarily 
service areas with politically favoured economic objectives – a trend that began to emerge as early 
as Gordon Brown’s premiership (Lupton, 2013). However whilst there may be ‘diversification’ of 
sources of funding and expansion of territorial reach, this is not diversifying the breadth of support 
for communities – social, community and environmental goals may become marginalised, resulting 
in a service profile increasingly out of step with communities’ priorities. There is a risk that NR 
organisations may increasingly become ‘detached’ from their original beneficiary neighbourhoods as 
financial imperatives, economic objectives and an increasingly competitive external environment 
narrow their capacity to serve broader  community needs (Clayton et al; 2016). 
Policy implications 
In England, policy instruments for NR organisations are now scant, but similar circumstances are now 
being experienced by VCS organisations more broadly. Policy needs to address the increased 
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volatility of the operational environment for such organisations. As mentioned, Scott (2010, p367) 
was cited suggesting that NR stakeholders should “… reflect on how well a time of relative plenty has 
prepared us for a time of famine”. However, past successive policy persistently encouraged spending 
all funding rather than saving for leaner times, to maximise the impact of delivery for funders. VCS 
and NR organisations also had little scope to prepare for ‘famine’, and VCS organisations are not 
encouraged by the Charity Commission to build up substantial reserves. The new environment is also 
resulting in the inefficient use of organisational resources to gain funding – feeding the income 
generation engine distracts organisations from the delivery of outcomes. Policy should therefore aim 
to enable organisations to either ‘harvest’ elements of awarded income, or be awarded some form 
of funding for operational overheads, to improve the stability and security of their financial position, 
enabling a focus on outcomes. Moreover, policy should also focus on mitigating the negative impacts 
of organisational responses to policy shift which may be diluting or even uncoupling organisations 
from their social mission of supporting and representing their local communities (Jones et al 2016). 
Implications for practice 
Some organisations are unable to respond to the challenges of the new environment following 
dramatic policy shift. Alternative options may involve down-sizing to a low cost, volunteer-centric 
community organisation or, at worst, closure. For those organisations attempting to survive ‘as is’, or 
by expanding entrepreneurial activity, the concept of the ‘income generation engine’ is likely to form 
the basis of their strategies under an austere climate. However, the findings also suggest that social 
mission is the victim of these evolutionary developments, and organisations’ strategies need to 
mitigate such negative impacts on local disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
Implications for research 
The conceptualisation outlined in this article provides pointers for future research. Such research 
should explore the impacts of marketisation on support organisations and their disadvantaged 
communities. Future studies should also focus on the impacts of the marketisation of, and continued 
entrepreneurialism in, those support organisations which are attempting to navigate an austere 
climate. The findings suggest that more research is particularly required regarding impacts of such 
changes on social goals, advocacy and representation of disadvantaged local neighbourhoods. 
In terms of organisational studies, further research should explore the strengths, weaknesses and 
contexts of the varieties of income generation engines and organisational dynamism that may exist. 
This could result in critical typologies developed by analyses of: the range of risks of types of engine 
and dynamism (financial, reputational and political); the linkages between engines, dynamism and 
profiles of NR activities, and; whether specific types of engines and dynamism enable higher levels of 
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community benefit. Such research may identify models of organisational development that generate 
sustainability for support organisations whilst retaining social goals for their local beneficiary 
communities. 
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